House Passes Bipartisan Bill on Chinese and Russian Influence in Georgia

The U.S. House of Representatives on June 8, 2026 passed the Countering China’s Control of the Caucasus Act, a bipartisan bill that orders a classified accounting of Russian and Chinese intelligence assets in Georgia. The bill, H.R. 7668, also requires a five-year US strategy for bilateral ties with Tbilisi, including a formal review of whether Georgia should remain a top American aid recipient in the Europe and Eurasia region.

The bill passed the House without objection, Civil Georgia reported, and now heads to the Senate. It was introduced February 24 by Joe Wilson, the Republican co-chairman of the US Helsinki Commission, and Steve Cohen, the Democratic ranking member of the commission.

What the Bill Actually Requires

The classified report must “examine the penetration of Russian and Chinese intelligence elements and their assets in Georgia” and “examine the potential intersection of Russian and Chinese influence and cooperation in Georgia,” per the H.R. 7668 full bill text. The submission, due 180 days after enactment, goes to the Senate and House committees on Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Armed Services. It must be written in classified form.

The strategy is the bill’s other pillar, and it carries a different tone. Within the same 180-day window, the Secretary of State must deliver a “detailed strategy” for the bilateral relationship. That strategy must include four specific determinations:

• Objectives: specific objectives for enhancing bilateral ties that reflect the current domestic political environment in Georgia.
• Resources: the tools, resources, and funding needed to achieve those objectives, and an assessment of whether Georgia should remain a top recipient of US funding in the Europe and Eurasia region.
• Continuity: the extent to which the US should continue to invest in its partnership with Georgia.
• Trade commitment: whether the Government of Georgia remains committed to expanding trade ties with the US and Europe, and whether the US Government should continue to invest in Georgian projects.

The strategy itself ships in unclassified form, with a classified annex; the intelligence report is fully classified. The bill does not sanction Georgian officials and does not appropriate new money. It is, in effect, a documentation exercise with a policy consequence built in: future US funding hinges on the findings.

A Bipartisan Vote Against Tbilisi’s Pivot

Floor debate ran the same day the House passed the bill. Republican Rep. Brian J. Mast of Florida, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, opened the proceedings by noting that “to this day, Russia occupies 20% of Georgia’s sovereign territory following its 2008 invasion.” He pointed to the Anaklia deep-water port, where a Chinese consortium was selected over a US company to develop a massive seaport on the Black Sea. “Competition is good,” Mast said. “But when it comes to critical infrastructure like this, our partners should take into consideration the risks posed by PRC.”

Wilson, the bill’s lead sponsor, framed the legislation as a defense of the Georgian people, not their government. The “illegitimate Georgian Dream team regime is in the process of selling out the country to the Chinese Communist Party and […] war criminal Putin and Iran, against the wishes of the Georgian people and the interests of the United States,” he told the House. “The election was rigged in Georgia,” he added, accusing Georgian Dream of peddling “the vilest anti-American propaganda” and insulting President Donald Trump. He called the bill the mechanism that “ensures that Chinese and Russian covert operations in the country are brought to light.” And he framed the aid question bluntly: the United States would “strongly consider whether Georgia should remain a top recipient of aid while it attacks America with its propaganda on an almost daily basis.”

Democratic Rep. Ami Bera of California tied the bill to a broader concern. “In recent years, the current Georgian Dream government, as well as foreign malign influence from Russia and China in Georgia, have threatened Georgia’s hard-fought democratic gains, corrupted some of its state institutions, and caused a rift in the U.S.-Georgia relations,” he said. The bill, Bera argued, “provides a framework for appropriate cooperation with the Georgian government going forward.”

Across the aisle, the bill drew no opposition. Civil Georgia reported the House passed it “without objection,” and the House Foreign Affairs Committee had advanced the measure with bipartisan support. The version considered by the full House carried an “as amended” tag on the floor schedule posted by the House majority leader.

• Feb 24, 2026: H.R. 7668 introduced by Wilson and Cohen.
• June 5, 2026: House Armed Services Committee approves two Georgia amendments for inclusion in the draft NDAA, including a similar Russia-China intelligence report requirement.
• June 8, 2026: H.R. 7668 passes the House “without objection.”

Tbilisi Pushes Back

Tbilisi’s response arrived within hours. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze called Wilson “an absolutely frivolous man,” per Interpressnews reporting cited by Tbilisi’s response to the House vote. Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze said Wilson was “not serious” and argued that Georgia “acts from its own national interests.” Parliament official Levan Makhashvili said the criticism of Georgia’s China ties looked like a “double standard” given US and European engagement with Beijing.

The Georgian Dream government has rejected the premise of the bill since its introduction. In a separate interview with RFE/RL, Wilson framed his work as a defense of the Georgian people rather than the ruling party. “The anti-American Georgian Dream party does not represent the Georgian people,” he said. “The Georgian people want to have a strong relationship with the United States.” Opposition figure Grigol Gegelia of the Lelo party read the House vote differently: it showed that Washington sees Georgia as strategically important, he told DFWatch, but also as a security concern under Georgian Dream.

criticism of Georgia’s China ties looked like a double standard, given US and European engagement with Beijing.

Levan Makhashvili, Georgian parliament official, per Interpressnews via DFWatch, June 8, 2026.

Anaklia, the Port at the Center

The Anaklia Deep Sea Port came up by name in nearly every floor speech. Located on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, the project was awarded to a Chinese-Singaporean consortium dominated by the Chinese state, per reporting by China Observers EU and the Jamestown Foundation. Wilson has called Anaklia the “center of gravity” of the broader contest, and the House-passed bill is, in effect, a procedural response to a port decision Tbilisi has already made. Wilson told the House that “the sea route of the Middle Corridor must run through Georgia, and the Chinese Communist Party is set […] to own and control the strategic deep port of the region: Anaklia Port on the Black Sea.”

Wilson compared Anaklia to the Panama Canal, telling Wilson’s interview on the Caucasus bill that “the reason China is trying to control [the port] is to control the ability of rare earths and rare minerals from Central Asia.” He drew a direct parallel to President Trump’s pressure on the Panama Canal, which he said pushed Chinese influence back. “Georgia is right in the middle of everything,” Wilson added.

Laura Linderman, director of programs at the American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, told RFE/RL that Washington has other tools. It can use its influence in the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to put conditions on infrastructure financing and steer subcontracts away from Chinese firms. “There are plenty of opportunities for Washington to influence the role of China in Georgia,” Linderman said. The strategy required by H.R. 7668 will land 180 days after enactment, and its findings on Anaklia-style projects will shape what those conditions look like.

Where the Bill Sits in the Wider Georgia Push

The Countering China’s Control of the Caucasus Act is a separate vehicle from the more famous MEGOBARI Act, the sanctions bill targeting Georgian Dream officials. The MEGOBARI Act passed the House 349-42 in May 2025 but stalled in the Senate, where Sen. Markwayne Mullin, an Oklahoma Republican, blocked it. Mullin has since moved to the cabinet as Secretary of Homeland Security, which Wilson told RFE/RL could clear a “lifeline” for the sanctions bill. Both bills require a classified accounting of Russian intelligence in Georgia; the new bill expands the scope to include Chinese intelligence and adds a five-year bilateral strategy that MEGOBARI does not.

There is also a parallel track in the National Defense Authorization Act. The House Armed Services Committee approved two Georgia-related amendments on June 5 for inclusion in the draft NDAA, including a similar Russian-Chinese intelligence reporting requirement. The same week, bipartisan majorities moved the standalone H.R. 7668 through the House.

H.R. 7668 was introduced on February 24, 2026, and passed the House on June 8, 2026. Its passage, on a Monday evening, came as Tbilisi was preparing a separate announcement on its relationship with Beijing. Tbilisi issued the announcement on June 9. The bill is one of two Georgia-related measures moving in Congress; the Armed Services Committee cleared a similar amendment for the NDAA on June 5. Senate action on H.R. 7668 has not been scheduled.

The Countering China’s Control of the Caucasus Act is sponsored by Wilson and Cohen alone. The House-passed version was “as amended,” per the majority leader’s schedule. The bill does not name the Georgian Dream party, nor does it name Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party’s founder and the country’s most powerful oligarch. The narrower scope of the new bill omits the sanctions, travel bans, and Global Magnitsky triggers that defined MEGOBARI.

Reps. Richard Hudson, a Republican, and Marc Veasey, a Democrat, who had pushed the parallel MEGOBARI Act, did not co-sponsor H.R. 7668. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not yet scheduled a markup.

The Senate and the 180-Day Clock

The bill now goes to the Senate, where the 180-day clock has not yet started. The clock starts on enactment, which requires Senate passage and the president’s signature. The deadline applies to both the classified intelligence report and the unclassified five-year strategy, both of which are due on the same day per the bill text. The Secretary of State, working with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, owns the intelligence report; the State Department owns the strategy.

On June 9, 2026, China and Georgia announced they had upgraded relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Prime Minister Kobakhidze called the agreement “very important” and said it would deepen ties with China.